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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Coleton Myers Sessions with manufacturing marijuana, delivery 
of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp. 17-18.)  He moved to suppress 
evidence based on a “police officer’s warrantless entry” into his home.  (R., pp. 23-31.)  
The state responded, acknowledging the warrantless entry, but asserting the warrantless 
entry was justified by exigent circumstances.  (R., pp. 33-40.)  The district court found the 
following facts relevant to the motion:  
 Sgt. Smith was called to a scene where a man, Stephen Miller, was “on a lawn 
unable to move and requesting medical assistance.”  (R., p. 68.)  Miller was able to move 
only his head, the rest of his body was “paralyzed.”  (Id.)  Miller stated that “he had 
consumed alcohol and marijuana prior to the paralysis.”  (Id.)  An ambulance took Miller 
to the hospital.  (Id.) 
 At the hospital officers spoke further with Miller, who told them he had purchased 
the marijuana from Sessions and gave them directions to the house.  (Id.)  Suspecting that 
the marijuana may have been laced or contaminated and was the cause of the paralysis, 
Sgt. Smith inquired of other officers if they were aware of other incidents of paralysis.  
“Sgt. Smith testified he was advised a couple of people had ended up in the hospital.”  (Id.1)   
                                            
1 Sgt. Smith testified that “a credible law enforcement source” had informed him that in 
the week to two-weeks prior to Mr. Miller’s incident there had been other incidents of 




 Sgt. Smith and other officers went to Sessions’ house.  (Id.)  They knocked and a 
woman answered the door.  (R., p. 69.)  Officers could detect “a strong odor of fresh 
marijuana.”  (Id.2)  Concerned that the marijuana Sessions was selling was tainted or 
adulterated and that such tainting or adulteration could endanger people, the officers 
entered.  (R., pp. 69-70.)  The court noted that the officers did not have any direct evidence 
that anyone was currently in distress at the house at the time officers entered.  (R., p. 70.) 
 In concluding that the entry was not justified by exigent circumstances, the district 
court noted that officers had “some information” that “a couple of individuals” had been 
treated for paralysis officers believed was the result of “tainted marijuana being used or 
sold by Mr. Sessions.”  (R., pp. 74-75.)  The court also concluded that officers had probable 
cause to believe there was marijuana in the house.  (R., p. 75.)  The district court concluded 
that there were no exigent circumstances because officers lacked “a report of someone in 
distress,” did not “observ[e] a person in medical distress,” were not “told there was a person 
in medical distress” and did not “hear[] anyone in distress.”  (R., p. 76.)  “The officers 
needed something more: hearing a person moaning or in distress, observing from the 
window or the open door a non-responsive person, being told that someone was 
complaining of a symptom of paralysis, seeing someone smoking marijuana believed to be 
tainted, etc.”  (R., p. 77.)  The district court granted the motion to suppress.  (R., p. 80.) 
 The state filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 82-84.) 
                                            
2 One officer testified that the odor was “overwhelmingly fresh marijuana,” while the other 
testified he smelled fresh, burnt and burning marijuana.  (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 9-19; p. 20, Ls. 18-
22; p. 31, Ls. 11-20.)  The district court determined this testimony was “conflicting.”  (R., 





 Did the district court err by applying an incorrect legal standard to the question of 







The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard To The Question Of 




 The state argued that the threat of immediate injury may create exigent 
circumstances, and that persons “were in potential danger of immediate harm” from using 
tainted marijuana.  (R., p. 35 (underlining omitted).)  The district court, however, limited 
its exigency analysis to whether officers had reason to believe that there was someone in 
the residence who had already been injured by the tainted marijuana.  (R., pp. 72-80.)  The 
district court erred by considering only the exigency of mitigating harm already caused and 
failing to consider the exigency of preventing potential future harm.  That Sessions or 
someone in his home could distribute or use the tainted marijuana in the time it would take 
to get a search warrant created an exigency from the threat of imminent injury, and 
therefore merited the immediate action of law enforcement.  Because exigent 
circumstances existed, the district court erred in granting suppression.  By applying an 
incorrect exigent circumstances standard that addressed only past harm, without 
considering the possibility of preventing harm, the district court erred. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The standard of review of a district court order granting or denying a suppression 
motion is bifurcated: factual findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous, but the Court 
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts found.  State v. 
Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009).  “Constitutional issues are purely 
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questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.”  State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 
849, 851, 275 P.3d 864, 866 (2012). 
 
C. The District Court Applied An Incorrect Standard Where Exigency Exists Only To 
Address Harm That Has Already Happened Where The Correct Standard Includes 
Preventing Possible Future Harms  
 
It is well settled that home entries necessitated by “exigent circumstances” do not 
offend the warrant requirement.  Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); State v. 
Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 434, 
925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 1996).  “The test for application of this warrant exception 
is whether the facts as known to the [officer] at the time of the entry, together with 
reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief that an exigency justified the 
intrusion.”  State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 912, 136 P.3d 379, 383 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217 (Ct. App. 2003)); accord State v. 
Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374-75, 209 P.3d 668, 671-72 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Reynolds, 
146 Idaho 466, 470, 197 P.3d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 2008). “Such exigencies” include 
“assist[ing] persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.”  
Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (emphasis added).  
Such a threat of imminent injury can arise from inherently dangerous substances, such as 
explosives.  Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1977)). 
In this case the officers had probable cause to believe that Sessions had marijuana 
in his home and reason to believe the marijuana was tainted, deliberately or inadvertently, 
with another substance that was causing at least temporary paralysis in its users.  Thus, the 
marijuana was an inherently dangerous substance that threatened its potential users with 
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imminent injury.  The officers’ entry to seize the dangerous substance and prevent that 
injury was therefore justified by exigent circumstances.    
The district court apparently believed that if officers had reason to believe that 
someone was already under the paralytic effects of the tainted marijuana the entry would 
have been justified by exigent circumstances.  This applies only part of the test, however 
(assisting the injured), without recognizing that preventing the injury in the first place is 
also an exigent circumstance.  This is a little like reasoning that the officers would not face 
exigent circumstances from explosives until the explosives detonate and injure people.  
Because the tainted marijuana was inherently dangerous to health, the officers faced an 
exigency that justified immediate action. 
The district court implicitly found such an exigency.  The district court endorsed 
the practice under these circumstances of securing the residence and then seeking a 
warrant.  (R., p. 79.)  Such would still have involved a warrantless entry in order to address 
the exigency.  The district court’s determination that officers were constitutionally justified 
in a warrantless entry to secure the premises to prevent harm should have led to denial of 
the motion to suppress. 
The district court applied an incorrect legal theory when it failed to recognize that 
preventing future injury, as opposed to merely addressing injury that has already occurred, 
is within the scope of the exigent circumstances exception.  The district court’s decision 
should be reversed.  Alternatively, the district court’s decision should be vacated and this 







 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse or to vacate, and to remand. 




        /s/ Kenneth K Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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